In the context of the Semantic Web, several approaches for combining ontologies, given in terms of theories of classical first-order logic and rule bases, have been proposed. They either cast rules into classical logic or limit the interaction between rules and ontologies. Autoepistemic logic (AEL) is an attractive formalism which allows overcoming these limitations by serving as a uniform host language to embed ontologies and nonmonotonic logic programs into it. For the latter, so far only the propositional setting has been considered. In this article, we present three embeddings of normal and three embeddings of disjunctive nonground logic programs under the stable model semantics into first-order AEL. While all embeddings correspond with respect to objective ground atoms, differences arise when considering nonatomic formulas and combinations with first-order theories. We compare the embeddings with respect to stable expansions and autoepistemic consequences, considering the embeddings by themselves, as well as combinations with classical theories. Our results reveal differences and correspondences of the embeddings, and provide useful guidance in the choice of a particular embedding for knowledge combination. 
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This raises the following questions: (a) which uniform formalism is suitable and (b) which embeddings are suitable and, furthermore, how do potentially suitable embeddings relate to each other and behave under knowledge combination?
Concerning the first question, Motik and Rosati [2007] use a variant of Lifschitz's bimodal nonmonotonic logic of minimal knowledge and negation-as-failure (MKNF) [Lifschitz 1991] . While the proposed embeddings of the first-order (FO) theory and the logic program are both faithful in the sense described above, the particular combination proposed by Motik and Rosati is only one among many possible methods, and MKNF is only one possible underlying formalism for such combinations (we discuss these issues in more detail in Section 8). Indeed, de Bruijn et al. [2007] use quantified equilibrium logic (QEL) [Pearce and Valverde 2005] as a host formalism. Unlike Motik and Rosati, de Bruijn et al. do not propose a new semantics for combinations, but rather show that QEL can capture the semantics of combinations by Rosati [2006] and can be used, for example, to define notions of equivalence of combinations.
Autoepistemic logic (AEL) [Moore 1985 ], which extends classical logic with a single nonmonotonic modal belief operator, being essentially the nonmonotonic variant of the modal logic kd45 [Shvarts 1990; Marek and Truszczyński 1993] , is an attractive candidate for serving as a uniform host formalism for combinations. Compared to other well-known nonmonotonic formalisms, like Reiter's default logic [Reiter 1980 ], FO-AEL offers a uniform language in which (nonmonotonic) rules themselves can be expressed at the object level. This conforms with the idea of treating an ontology and a logic program together as a unified theory. Furthermore, in FO-AEL we can decide, depending on the context, whether (the negation of) a particular atomic formula should be interpreted nonmonotonically simply by including a modal operator. This enables us to use the same predicate in both a monotonic and a nonmonotonic context. This is in contrast to circumscription [McCarthy 1986 ], in which we have to decide, for the entire theory, which predicates are to be minimized.
Embedding a classical theory in AEL is trivial, and several embeddings of logic programs in AEL have been described [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Lifschitz and Schwarz 1993; Chen 1993; Przymusinski 1991a ]. However, they have all been developed for the propositional case only, whereas we need to deal with nonground theories and programs. This requires us to consider firstorder autoepistemic logic (FO-AEL) [Konolige 1991; Kaminski and Rey 2002; Levesque and Lakemeyer 2000] , and nonground versions of these embeddings. We consider the semantics for FO-AEL as defined by Konolige [1991] , because it faithfully extends first-order logic with equality (other variants are discussed in Section 8).
Motivated by these issues, our contribution in this article is twofold.
(1) We define several embeddings of nonground logic programs into FO-AEL, taking into account subtle issues of quantification in FO-AEL. In more detail, we present three embeddings, τ HP , τ EB , and τ EH , for normal logic programs which extend respective embeddings for the propositional case [Gelfond 1987; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Chen 1993; Lifschitz 1994] , and three embeddings, τ [Przymusinski 1991a; . We show that all these embeddings are faithful in the sense that the stable models of the logic program P and the sets of objective ground atoms in the stable expansions of the embeddings τ χ (P) (χ ∈ {HP , EB , EH }) are in a one-to-one correspondence (Theorem 5.3). However, the embeddings behave differently on formulas beyond ground atoms, in some cases already for simple ground formulas. This, in turn, may impact the behavior of the embeddings when used in combinations of logic programs and classical theories. This raises the question under which conditions the embeddings differ and under which conditions they correspond. Of particular interest for knowledge combination is how these embeddings behave relative to each other in combinations with classical theories.
(2) To answer these questions, we conduct two comparative studies of the behavior of the various embeddings. We consider three classes of programs: ground, safe, and arbitrary logic programs under the stable model semantics.
(a) We first determine correspondences between the stable expansions of different embeddings τ χ beyond ground atomic formulas (Propositions 5.5-5.9), and present inclusion relations between the sets of consequences of the embeddings (Theorems 5.14 and 5.15). These results already allow us to draw a few conclusions on the behavior of embeddings in combinations. (b) We then determine correspondences between stable expansions for combinations of logic programs with classical theories. Here, we take the shape of the logic program, the shape of the classical theory, and the type of formulas of interest for the correspondence into account. To this end, we consider different fragments of classical logic that are important for knowledge representation, including Horn, universal, and generalized Horn theories. The latter are of particular interest for ontologies, since they essentially include RDF Schema [de Bruijn and Heymans 2007] , Horn-SHIQ [Hustadt et al. 2005] , and the OWL 2 profiles QL, RL, and EL [OWL 2 Profiles 2009]; furthermore, they essentially also include Tuple Generating Dependencies [Abiteboul et al. 1995] , which are a popular class of constraints in databases. Our main result for embeddings in combinations (Theorem 6.2) gives a complete picture of the correspondences, which reveals that they behave differently in general, and shows the restrictions on the program or theory that give rise to correspondence.
The results of these studies not only deepen the understanding of the individual embeddings, but also have practical implications with respect to their use. They tell us in which situations one embedding may be used instead of another.
Noticeably, the embeddings of logic programs we study can be seen as building blocks for actual combinations of a classical theory and a logic program P. The most straightforward combination is ι( , P) = σ ( ) ∪ τ χ (P), where σ is the identity mapping and τ χ is one of the embeddings we consider. We could also imagine adding axioms to, or changing axioms in ; similarly, rules could be changed in, or added to P before translating them (e.g., grounding rules, as customary in logic programming). If and P are the obtained classical theory and logic program, our results are still applicable to the combination ι ( , P) = ∪ τ χ (P ). In fact, whenever the combination is of the form ∪ τ χ (P ), regardless of and P, the correspondences and differences between the embeddings we establish hold. Furthermore, the effect of different program rewritings P in combinations may be assessed.
To illustrate the use of our results, we show applications to the Semantic Web. More specifically, we show that the semantics of existing combinations of ontologies and rules in this context can be captured, and that via our correspondence result, properties of the semantics can be derived, as well as their behavior in other (modified) combinations. Finally we show how the embeddings we consider can be used to extend combinations to richer languages, particularly extensions of rule languages with nonmonotonic negation. However, while we focus here on the Semantic Web, applications in other contexts (e.g., data modeling languages like UML plus OCL) might also be explored.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. We review the definitions of first-order logic and logic programs in Section 2. We proceed to describe first-order autoepistemic logic (FO-AEL) and present a novel characterization of stable expansions for certain kinds of theories in Section 3. The embeddings of normal and disjunctive logic programs and our results about faithfulness of the embeddings are described in Section 4. We investigate the relationships between the embeddings themselves, and under combination with first-order theories, in Sections 5 and 6. We discuss applications to the Semantic Web in Section 7, and further implications in Section 8. We discuss related work in Section 9, and conclude and outline future work in Section 10. Proofs of the results in Sections 5 and 6 can be found in the Appendix.
PRELIMINARIES
Let us briefly recapitulate some basic elements of first-order logic and logic programs as well as some relevant notation.
First-Order Logic
We consider first-order logic with equality. A language L is defined over a signature = (F, P), where F and P are countable sets of function and predicate symbols, respectively. Function symbols with arity 0 are also called constants. Furthermore, V is a countably infinite set of variables. Terms and atomic formulas (atoms) are constructed as usual. Ground terms are also called names; N denotes the set of names of a given signature . Complex formulas are constructed as usual using the primitive symbols ¬, ∧, ∃, '(', and ')'. As usual, φ ∨ ψ is short for ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ); φ ⊃ ψ is short for ¬φ ∨ ψ; and ∀x.φ(x) is short for ¬∃x.¬φ(x). We sometimes write t 1 = t 2 , where t 1 and t 2 are terms, as an abbreviation for ¬(t 1 = t 2 ). The universal closure of a formula φ is denoted by (∀) φ. L g is the restriction of L to ground formulas and L ga is the restriction of L g to atomic formulas. An FO theory ⊆ L is a set of closed formulas, that is, every variable is bound by a quantifier.
An interpretation of a language L is a tuple w = U, · I , where U is a nonempty set, called the domain, and · I is a mapping which assigns to every n-ary function symbol f ∈ F a function f I : U n → U , and to every n-ary predicate symbol p ∈ P a relation p I ⊆ U n . A variable assignment B for w is a mapping that assigns to every variable
, is defined as usual; if t is ground, we sometimes write t w . We call an individual k named if there is some name t ∈ N such that t w = k, and unnamed otherwise. Interpretations are named if all individuals are named. We say that the unique names assumption applies to an interpretation if all names are interpreted distinctly, and we say that the standard names assumption applies if, in addition, the interpretation is named.
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A name substitution β is a partial function that assigns variables in V the names from N ; we also write x/β(x) for (x, β(x)). As usual, β is total if its domain is V. Given a variable assignment B for an interpretation w, we define the set of named variables in B as V N . The application of a name substitution β to some term, formula, or theory χ , denoted by χβ, is defined as syntactical replacement, as usual. Clearly, if the unique names assumption applies, each variable assignment has a unique associated substitution; if the standard names assumption applies, each associated substitution is total.
Example 2.1. Consider a language L with constants F = {a, b, c} and an interpretation w = U, · I with U = {k, l, m} such that a w = k, b w = l, and c w = l, and the variable assignment B: x B = k, y B = l and z B = m. B has two associated name substitutions, β 1 = {x/a, y/b} and β 2 = {x/a, y/c}, which are both not total.
Logic Programs
A disjunctive logic program P consists of rules of the form
where
. . , c n are equality-free atoms, with m, n ≥ 0 and l ≥ 1. H(r) = {h 1 , . . . , h l } is the set of head atoms of r; B + (r) = {b 1 , . . . , b m } is the set of positive body atoms of r; and B − (r) = {c 1 , . . . , c n } is the set of negated body atoms of r. If l = 1, then r is normal. If B − (r) = ∅, then r is positive. If every variable in r occurs in B + (r), then r is safe. If every rule r ∈ P is normal (resp., positive, safe), then P is normal (resp., positive, safe).
Each program P has a signature P , which contains the function and predicate symbols that occur in P. We assume that P contains some 0-ary function symbol if it has predicate symbols of arity greater than 0. With L P we denote the first-order language over P . As usual, Herbrand interpretations M of P are subsets of the set of ground atoms of L P .
The grounding of a logic program P, denoted gr(P), is the union of all possible ground instantiations of P, obtained by replacing each variable in a rule r with a name in N P for each rule r ∈ P.
Let P be a positive program. A Herbrand interpretation M of P is a Herbrand model of P if, for every rule r ∈ gr(P), B + (r) ⊆ M implies H(r) ∩ M = ∅, and, for every t ∈ N P ,
Following Gelfond and Lifschitz [1991] , the reduct of a logic program P with respect to an interpretation M, denoted P M , is obtained from gr(P) by deleting (i) each rule r with B − (r) ∩ M = ∅ and (ii) not c from the body of every remaining rule r with c ∈ B − (r). If M is a minimal Herbrand model of P M , then M is a stable model of P.
Example 2.2. Consider the program
The reduct
has M 1 as a minimal model, thus M 1 is a stable model of P. The other stable models of
FIRST-ORDER AUTOEPISTEMIC LOGIC
We adopt first-order autoepistemic logic (FO-AEL) under the any-and all-name semantics of Konolige [1991] . These semantics allow quantification over arbitrary domains and generalize classical first-order logic with equality, thereby allowing a trivial embedding of first-order theories (with equality). Other approaches like those by Kaminski and Rey [2002] or Levesque and Lakemeyer [2000] require interpretations to follow the unique or standard names assumptions, and therefore do not allow such direct embeddings.
An FO-AEL language L L is defined relative to a first-order language L by allowing the unary modal operator L in the construction of formulas-Lφ is usually read as "φ is known" or "φ is believed". As usual, closed formulas, that is, formulas without free variable occurrences, are called sentences; formulas of the form Lφ, where φ is a formula, are modal atoms; and L-free formulas are objective. Standard autoepistemic logic is variable-free FO-AEL.
To distinguish between semantic notions defined for the any-respectively, all-name semantics, we use the symbols E ("Existence of name") and A ("for All names") in the respective notations.
An autoepistemic interpretation is a pair w, , where w = U, · I is a first-order interpretation and ⊆ L L is a set of sentences, called a belief set. Satisfaction of a formula Lφ in an interpretation w, with respect to a variable assignment B under the any-name semantics, denoted (w, B) |= E Lφ, is defined as (w, B) |= E Lφ iff, for some name substitution β associated with B, φβ is closed and φβ ∈ . Note that the any-and all-name semantics always coincide for objective formulas and, if the unique (or standard) names assumption applies, also for arbitrary formulas in L L ; this was also observed by Kaminski and Rey [2002] . In such situations, that is, where both semantics coincide, we sometimes use |= rather than |= E or |= A . Furthermore, when talking about entailment |= φ under the standard names assumption, we mean entailment considering only interpretations for which the standard names assumption holds. That is, |= φ under the standard names assumption if for every interpretation w such that the standard names assumption applies in w and w |= , w |= φ.
Satisfaction of arbitrary formulas is then as follows
, with x B = k, iff, for some t ∈ N , t w = k, and p(t) ∈ . Thus, φ is false (unsatisfied) in any interpretation where p I contains unnamed individuals. Analogous for the all-name semantics.
The following example illustrates the difference between the any-and all-name semantics.
Example 3.2. Consider a language with constant symbols a, b, and unary predicate symbol p, and an interpretation w, with w = {k}, · I and = {p(a)}.
A stable expansion is a set of beliefs of an ideally introspective agent (i.e., an agent with perfect reasoning capabilities and with knowledge about its own beliefs), given some
Recall that L g and L ga denote the restrictions of L to ground and ground atomic formulas, respectively. Given a set of sentences ⊆ L L , o , og , and oga denote the restrictions of to objective, objective ground, and objective ground atomic formulas, respectively, that is, o = ∩ L, og = ∩ L g , and oga = ∩ L ga .
Every stable expansion T of is a stable set [Stalnaker 1993 ], which means that it satisfies the following conditions: (a) T is closed under first-order entailment; (b) if φ ∈ T then Lφ ∈ T ; and (c) if φ / ∈ T then ¬Lφ ∈ T . Furthermore, if T is consistent, the converse statements of (b) and (c) hold. Konolige [1991] 
Since there is no nesting of modal operators in , we combine this result with Proposition 3.3 to obtain o = {φ ∈ L | |=
We note here that, unlike in standard autoepistemic logic, in FO-AEL two different stable expansions may have the same objective subsets, both under the any-and allname semantics. Consider, for example, the theories = {∀x. p(x)} and = {∀x.L p(x)} and their respective stable expansions T and T . We have that T o = T o is the closure under first-order entailment of {∀x. p(x)}, but we also have that ∀x.
is not satisfied in any interpretation that has unnamed individuals.
EMBEDDING NONGROUND LOGIC PROGRAMS
We define an embedding τ as a function that takes a logic program P as its argument and returns a set of sentences in the FO-AEL language obtained from P . Janhunen [1999] studied translations between nonmonotonic formalisms and formulated a number of desiderata for such translation functions, namely faithfulness, polynomiality, and modularity (FPM). We adapt these notions to our case of embedding logic programs into FO-AEL.
An embedding τ is faithful if, for any logic program P, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the stable models of P and the consistent stable expansions of τ (P) with respect to ground atomic formulas.
An embedding τ is polynomial if, for any logic program P, τ (P) can be computed in time polynomial in the size of P.
An embedding τ is modular if, for any two logic programs P 1 and P 2 , τ (P 1 ∪ P 2 ) = τ (P 1 ) ∪ τ (P 2 ). Furthermore, we call τ signature-modular if, for any two logic programs P 1 and P 2 with the same signature , τ (P 1 ∪ P 2 ) = τ (P 1 ) ∪ τ (P 2 ).
Since the unique names assumption does not hold in FO-AEL in general, it is necessary to axiomatize default uniqueness of names (as introduced by Konolige [1991] ) to assure faithfulness of several of the embeddings. Given a signature , by UNA we denote the set of axioms
Default uniqueness, in contrast to rigid uniqueness (i.e., UNA axioms of the form t 1 = t 2 ), allows first-order theories that are later combined with the embedding to "override" such inequalities, rather than introducing inconsistency. For example, the theory = {¬L(a = b) ⊃ a = b} has a single expansion that includes a = b; the single expansion of ∪ {a = b} is consistent and includes a = b.
Observe that the UNA axioms depend on the signature. In addition, the union of the UNA axioms of two signatures is not necessarily the same as the set of UNA axioms of the union of these two signatures: given two signatures 1 and 2 such that F 1 = F 2 , UNA 1 ∪ UNA 2 = UNA 1 ∪ 2 , that is, the UNA axioms corresponding to different signatures cannot be combined in a modular fashion. This means that embeddings that include such UNA signatures are not modular, but may be signature-modular.
We first present the embeddings of normal programs and then proceed with the embeddings of disjunctive programs.
Embedding Normal Logic Programs
We consider three embeddings of nonground logic programs into FO-AEL, denoted τ HP , τ EB , and τ EH . HP stands for H orn for P ositive rules (positive rules are translated to objective Horn clauses); EB stands for E pistemic rule B odies (the body of a rule can only become true if it is known to be true); and EH stands for E pistemic rule H eads (if the body of a rule is true, the head is known to be true).
The HP embedding is an extension of the one that originally led Gelfond and Lifschitz to the definition of the stable model semantics [Gelfond 1987; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988] . The EB and EH embeddings are extensions of embeddings by . The EH embedding was independently described by Lifschitz and Schwarz [1993] and by Chen [1993] . The original motivation for the EB and EH embeddings was the possibility to directly embed programs with strong negation and disjunction. Furthermore, Marek and Truszczynski arrived at their embeddings through embeddings of logic programs in reflexive autoepistemic logic [Schwarz 1992 ], which is equivalent to McDermott's nonmonotonic modal sw5 [McDermott 1982] , and the subsequent embedding of reflexive autoepistemic logic into standard AEL. Lifschitz and Schwarz arrived at the EH embedding through an embedding of logic programs in Lifschitz's nonmonotonic logic of minimal belief and negation-as-failure (MBNF) [Lifschitz 1994 ] and the subsequent embedding of MBNF into standard AEL. Finally, Chen also arrived at the EH embedding via MBNF, but he subsequently embedded MBNF in Levesque's logic of only knowing [Levesque 1990 ], a subset of which corresponds with standard AEL.
Definition 4.1. Let r be a normal rule of the form (1). Then,
Furthermore, given a normal logic program P, we define
For all three embeddings, we assume τ χ (P) = P (here and henceforth χ ranges over HP , EB , and EH ). Furthermore, by τ − χ we denote the embedding τ χ without the UNA axioms: given a normal logic program P, τ − χ (P) = τ χ (P) − UNA P . The embeddings τ − χ are modular and polynomial. The embeddings τ χ are signature-modular and polynomial, provided N P is polynomial in the size of P (e.g., if there are no function symbols with arity greater than 0). In the examples of embeddings in the remainder of the article we do not write the UNA axioms explicitly.
A notable difference between the embedding τ HP , on the one hand, and the embeddings τ EB and τ EH , on the other, is that, given a logic program P, the stable expansions of τ HP (P) include the "contrapositives" of the rules in P (viewed classically and where ¬La is not a), which is not true for τ EB (P) and τ EH (P) in general.
For standard AEL and ground logic programs, the following faithfulness result straightforwardly extends results by Gelfond and Lifschitz [1988] and .
PROPOSITION 4.3. A Herbrand interpretation M of a ground normal logic program P is a stable model of P iff there exists a consistent stable expansion T of τ
Observe from the proposition that we do not require the UNA axioms in the embeddings of ground programs. These axioms are required in the general case when embedding nonground programs, as illustrated by Example 4.8 below. The following example illustrates the embeddings for the case of nonground programs.
Likewise, each of the embeddings τ χ (P) has a single consistent stable expansion T χ :
The stable expansions in Example 4.4 agree on objective ground atoms, but not on arbitrary formulas. We now extend Proposition 4.3 to the nonground case. To this end, we use the following two lemmas.
LEMMA 4.5. Let P be a normal logic program, let X ∈ {E, A}, let T be a stable X expansion of τ χ (P), and let α be an objective ground atom. Then, τ χ (P) |=
PROOF. We start with the first statement. (⇒) This is obvious, as interpretations under the standard names assumption are just special interpretations.
(⇐) We start with the case of the any-names assumption. Assume, on the contrary, that τ χ (P) |= T oga α under the standard names assumption, but τ χ (P) |=
α. By the fact that the only occurrences of the equality symbol in τ χ (P) are in the UNA axioms, the only atoms in T oga involving equality are of the form t = t for t ∈ N P . Consider two distinct names t 1 , t 2 ∈ N P and the UNA axiom ¬Lt 1 = t 2 ⊃ t 1 = t 2 ∈ UNA P . Since w, T oga is a model of the axiom and
Consequently, it must be the case that · I maps every name to a distinct individual in U .
We assume that the mapping · I extends to ground terms in the natural way, that is,
. We construct the interpretation w = U , · I as follows:
n ∈ p I for n-ary predicate symbol p and every t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ N n . Clearly, the standard names assumption holds for w , and w and w agree on objective ground atoms, that is, w |= α iff w |= α for any α ∈ L ga . We now show that w |= T oga τ χ (P).
Clearly, w , T oga satisfies the UNA axioms, since the standard names assumption holds for w and since T oga contains only the trivial equalities. We first consider the embedding τ EH and some
for every variable assignment B of w. Now consider a variable assignment B of w and the corresponding variable assignment B of w, which we define as follows: x B = k iff there is a t ∈ N P such that x B = t and t I = k. Observe that B assigns every variable to a named individual. Consider a name substitution β that is associated with B; since all names are interpreted as distinct individuals (by the UNA axioms), ( †) β is unique. Moreover, by construction of B, β is also the only substitution associated with B .
By construction of w , and since β is the unique substitution associated with B (and B ), we have, for every objective atom α such that B is defined for all variables in α, that (w, B) |=
Thus, we obtain w |= T oga τ EH (P). Since w and w agree on objective ground atoms, w |= T oga α, and thus τ EH (P) |= T oga α under the standard names assumption. This contradicts the initial assumption. Therefore, τ EH (P) |=
The argument for the embeddings τ EB and τ HP is analogous: simply leave out the positive occurrences of modal atoms in the consequents, respectively consequents and antecedents, in the argument above.
Likewise, the argument for the case of the all-name semantics is analogous. Observe that in the argument about variable assignments ( †), β is the only name substitution associated with B; hence, the any-and all-name semantics coincide, and the subsequent arguments immediately also apply for the all-name semantics.
For the second statement, consider the above argument without the part about the UNA axioms and the following simple adaptation: if (w, B) |= A T oga ¬Lc j , then for all associated name substitutions β, there is some c i β ∈ T oga , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. One of these name substitutions is the one associated with B ; the remainder of the argument remains the same. It follows that τ PROOF. We prove the first statement, first for the special case that the standard names assumption applies, and then use Lemma 4.5 to extend it to cases where the standard names assumption does not apply.
Consider a belief set ⊆ L L and an interpretation w for which the standard names assumption holds. We claim that ( * ) w |= X τ χ (gr(P)) iff w |= X τ χ (P). By the standard names assumption, we have that w |= X τ χ (P) iff for every φ ∈ τ χ (P), w |= X φ. In turn, this holds iff for every variable assignment B, (w, B) |= X φ, which in turn holds iff for the name substitution β associated with B (which is unique and total, by the standard names assumption), w |= X φβ. By definition, τ χ (gr(P)) contains all (and only) the formulas of the form φβ where φ ∈ τ χ (P) and β is a name substitution associated with some variable assignment B for w; the claim ( * ) follows immediately from this.
(⇒) Let T be a stable expansion of τ χ (P). By Lemma 4.5 and the above we have:
Hence by Proposition 3.4,
The converse is analogous. For the second statement of the lemma, the same proof using Lemma 4.5 works. PROOF. By Lemma 4.6, we can reduce embeddability of nonground logic programs to embeddability of ground logic programs.
Consider an embedding τ χ (gr(P)) and a stable expansion T . Clearly, there is no interaction between the UNA axioms and the axioms resulting from rules in P. Therefore, τ − χ (gr(P)) has a stable expansion T such that T oga = T oga , and vice versa. The theorem then follows immediately from Proposition 4.3.
Note that this result does not extend to the embeddings τ Example 4.8. Consider P = {p(n 1 ); r(n 2 ); q ← not p(x)} such that P has only two names, n 1 and n 2 . P has one stable model, M = {p(n 1 ), r(n 2 ), q}. τ
To see why this is the case, consider an interpretation w with only one individual k. L p(x) is trivially true under the any-name semantics, because there is some name for k such that p(t) ∈ T (viz. t = n 1 ). In the all-name semantics, this situation does not occur, because for L p(x) to be true, p(t) must be included in T for every name (t = n 1 and t = n 2 ) for k. We can similarly verify that the result does not apply to the embeddings τ − EB and τ − EH under the all-name semantics, by the positive modal atoms in the antecedents.
Embedding Disjunctive Logic Programs
The embeddings τ HP and τ EB cannot be extended straightforwardly to the case of disjunctive logic programs, even for the propositional case. Consider the program P = {a | b ←}, which has two stable models: M 1 = {a} and M 2 = {b}. However, a naive extension of τ HP , τ HP (P) = {a ∨ b}, has one stable expansion
In contrast, τ EH can be extended straightforwardly because of the modal atoms in the consequent of the implication: τ
The so-called positive introspection axioms (PIAs) [Przymusinski 1991a ] remedy this situation for defining extensions τ Each PIA ensures that a consistent stable expansion contains either α or ¬α.
It would have been possible to define the PIAs in a different way: (∀) φ ⊃ Lφ for any objective atomic formula φ. This would, however, effectively close the domain of the predicates in P (see Example 3.1). We deem this aspect undesirable in combinations with FO theories.
Definition 4.9. Let r be a rule of form (1). Then,
Given a disjunctive logic program P, we define:
we denote the embedding τ ∨ χ without the UNA axioms. Note that the observations about modularity of the embeddings τ χ extend to the disjunctive embeddings τ ∨ χ ; the PIAs do not compromise modularity. However, polynomiality of embeddings with PIAs is lost if the size of L ga is not polynomial in the size of P. We do not write the UNA and PIA axioms explicitly in the examples below.
For standard AEL and ground disjunctive logic programs, the correspondence between the stable models of P and the stable expansions τ ∨ HP (P) and τ ∨ EH (P), respectively, is due to Przymusinski [1991a] and .
PROPOSITION 4.10. A Herbrand interpretation M of a ground disjunctive logic program P is a stable model of P iff there is a consistent stable expansion T of τ
We generalize this result to the case of FO-AEL and nonground programs, and additionally for τ ∨ EB , similar to the case of normal programs. LEMMA 4.11. Let P be a logic program, let X ∈ {E, A}, let T be a stable X expansion of τ ∨ χ (P), and let α be an objective ground atom. Then, τ
The argument is a straightforward adaptation of the argument in the "⇐" direction in the proof of Lemma 4.5: simply replace the consequent h 1 ∧ Lh 1 with the disjunction
Furthermore, it is also easy to see that, as w and w agree on ground atomic formulas, if the PIA axioms are satisfied in w, T oga , then they are satisfied in w , T oga . LEMMA 4.12. Let P be a logic program and let X ∈ {E, A}. There exists a stable PROOF. The reduction of embeddability of nonground programs in FO-AEL to ground logic programs in standard AEL follows from Lemma 4.12.
Embeddability of gr(P) using τ 
(by the PIA axioms). Therefore, the stable expansions of τ Example 4.14. Consider P = {p | q ← }. Then, τ ∨ HP (P) = {p ∨ q} ∪ PIA P has the stable expansions T
Note that the embedding τ HP cannot be naively extended to logic programs with strong ("classical") negation ∼ [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991] , even for the propositional case. Take, for example, the logic program P = {p ←∼ p}; it has one stable model, namely M = ∅. The naive extension of τ HP treats strong negation as negation in classical logic and the embedding of P yields {¬ p ⊃ p}, which has one stable expansion, which includes p. It was shown by that, for the propositional case, the embeddings τ EB and τ EH can be naively extended to the case of logic programs with strong negation: consider a rule of the form (1) such that h i , b j , c k are either atoms or strongly negated atoms, and an extension of the embeddings τ EB , τ EH such that ∼ is translated to classical negation ¬; then, Proposition 4.3 straightforwardly extends to these extended versions of τ EB and τ EH . These results can be straightforwardly extended to the nonground case. Embedding of logic programs with strong negation using τ HP can be done by rewriting P to a logic program P without strong negation and subsequently embedding P ; see Gelfond and Lifschitz [1991] for such a rewriting.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE EMBEDDINGS
In this section we explore correspondences between the embeddings presented in the previous section. We compare the stable expansions of the individual embeddings and, at the level of inference, we compare the sets of autoepistemic consequences. To this end we introduce the following notation: The properties stated in this section holds, regardless of whether X = E or X = A is considered. Therefore, we omit the superscript X from |= X , ≡ X γ , Cn X , stable X , and so on.
Furthermore, we write
In our analysis, we consider different classes of logic programs. With the symbols LP, sLP, and gLP we denote the classes of arbitrary, safe, and ground disjunctive logic programs, respectively. Observe the following inclusions between the classes:
We use the letter n to denote the restriction of the respective classes to the case of normal programs: nLP, snLP, and gnLP.
We start in Section 5.1 with an investigation of the correspondences between stable expansions and subsequently consider in Section 5.2 correspondences between sets of consequences. Note that while 1 ≡ γ 2 implies Cn γ ( 1 ) = Cn γ ( 2 ), the converse is not true in general. Thus, for applications based on consequence rather than stable expansions, more flexibility between the choice of equivalent embeddings can be expected, as one-to-one correspondence between stable expansions is not required. In order not to interrupt the flow of reading, the proofs of most of the results in this section can be found in the Appendix.
Relationships between Stable Expansions of Embeddings
From Theorems 4.7 and 4.13, we immediately obtain the following result concerning correspondence of stable expansions, which is our main result in this regard.
Thus, all embeddings may be used interchangeably when concerned with ground atoms. This does not hold for the case of arbitrary objective ground formulas.
Example 5.4. Consider the logic program P = {a ← b}. Then τ HP (P) = {b ⊃ a} has a single stable expansion, which contains b ⊃ a; also τ EB (P) = {b ∧ Lb ⊃ a} has a single stable expansion, but it does not contain b ⊃ a. Note that while the latter contains Lb ⊃ b, it does not contain b ⊃ Lb (which would enable obtaining b ⊃ a).
The situation changes for the embeddings τ ∨ HP and τ ∨ EB due to the PIA axioms. PROPOSITION 5.5. For every P ∈ nLP, τ EB (P) ≡ og τ EH (P), and for every P ∈ LP, τ
For nonground formulas we obtain the following result. PROPOSITION 5.6. For every P ∈ snLP, τ EB (P) ≡ τ EH (P).
For arbitrary normal programs, the embeddings τ EB and τ EH differ. Example 5.7. Consider P = {p(a); p(x); q(x) ← p(x)}. Then, the embedding
} has one stable expansion, which does not contain ∀x.q(x), because ∀x.L p(x) is not necessarily true when ∀x. p(x) is true; in other words, the converse Barcan formula (L∀x.φ(x) ⊃ ∀x.Lφ(x)) is not universally valid, which is a property of FO-AEL under both the any-and all-name semantics [Konolige 1991] .
Note that the result also does not extend to the embeddings τ HP and τ
has one stable expansion which does not contain ∀x. p(x) ⊃ q(x). This difference is caused by the fact that L p(x) will be false in case an unnamed individual is assigned to x. Similar observations hold for τ ∨ HP ; the PIA axioms do not help, since they are only concerned with ground atoms, and thus do not apply to unnamed individuals.
Note that this result does not extend to the embedding τ ∨ EH ; it does not include the PIA axioms, and thus the argument used in the proof of Proposition 5.9 does not apply.
Relationships between Consequences of Embeddings
In order to investigate the relationships between the embeddings with respect to autoepistemic consequences, we first compare the embeddings with respect to their autoepistemic models. Recall that an autoepistemic interpretation w, T consists of a first-order interpretation w and a belief set T ⊆ L L . PROPOSITION 5.10. For every P ∈ nLP and every interpretation w, T , w |= T τ EH (P) implies w |= T τ EB (P) and w |= T τ HP (P) implies w |= T τ EB (P).
PROPOSITION 5.11. For every P ∈ LP and every interpretation w,
We now consider the relative behavior of the embeddings with respect to autoepistemic consequences. In order to present our results in a compact and accessible way, we show a small (yet sufficient) number of relationships between the sets of consequences in a graph (Figure 1 ). Every particular relationship between embeddings can be derived easily from paths in this graph.
Specifically, in Figure 1 
χ (P)), the straight arrow −→ represents set inclusion (⊆), and the dotted arrow represents set inclusion in case P is safe. Since −→ implies , dotted arrows are only shown if straight arrows are absent. Similarly, in Figure 1 The following lemma states the correctness of Figure 1(a) .
γ (P)) for every P ∈ nLP (resp., for every P ∈ snLP). Furthermore,
for every P ∈ LP (resp., for every P ∈ sLP).
Note that by transitivity of ⊆, paths in the graph yield further relations; for example,
HP via a path with straight edges. We now show that the graph exactly characterizes the containment relationships via paths. To this end, we first note some negative relationships between embeddings.
LEMMA 5.13. The following inclusion relations do not hold:
From these negative relationships, combined with the positive ones above, we can infer further negative relationships. For example, from C
Exploiting this, we show the following result. THEOREM 5.14. For P ∈ nLP (resp.,
χ in the graph in Figure 1 (a) on a path with −→ arcs (resp., with arbitrary arcs).
Likewise, for P ∈ LP (resp., P ∈ sLP), we have that Cn o (τ
χ on a path with −→ (resp., with arbitrary arcs). PROOF. By Lemmas 5.12 and 5.13, the respective containment relationships are correct. Clearly, by reflexivity and transitivity of set inclusion, paths in the graph of Figure 1 (a) are sound with respect to positive containments. Their completeness, for both arbitrary P and safe P, is established using the following basic properties of noninclusion: (i) A ⊆ B and C ⊆ B implies A ⊆ C and (ii) A ⊆ B and A ⊆ C implies C ⊆ B 5 . Exhaustive application to the (non-)containments in Lemmas 5.12 and 5.13 (e.g., using a simple logic program) yields one of C
HP are the only nontrivial inclusions for arbitrary programs besides those in Figure 1(a) ; for safe programs, there are more. We note that the figure is minimal, in the sense that if any of the arcs is removed (or turned from solid into dashed), the theorem no longer holds.
The containment relationships in Figure 1 
in the graph in Figure 1(b) . Furthermore, for every P ∈ LP,
PROOF. By Theorem 5.14 and Proposition 5.5, C ∨ EH , C EH , and C EB collapse, and by Proposition 5.5, C ∨ EB and C ∨ HP collapse. That the other relationships in Figure 1 (a) remain unchanged follows from Example 5.4, the proof of Lemma 5.13, and reasoning about subsets as in the proof of Theorem 5.14.
COMBINATIONS WITH FIRST-ORDER THEORIES
In this section we explore correspondences between the logic program embeddings from Section 4 in combinations with FO theories. To this end, we consider a basic combination of logic programs P and FO theories defined as
where L L is the union of the signatures and P . More involved combinations (e.g., which augment P and with further rules and axioms, respectively) might be recast to such basic combinations.
In the preceding sections we have considered both the any-and all-name semantics, both in the definition of the embeddings and in our analysis of the differences between the embeddings of logic programs. It turned out that the embeddings are faithful for both semantics (cf., Theorems 4.7 and 4.13), implying correspondence with respect to objective ground atoms between the two semantics for all embeddings τ (∨) χ , and the relationships between the embeddings stated in the previous section hold for both semantics. However, in combinations with FO theories, the two semantics diverge, since names from the first-order part may not be provably identical to or different from other names. The following example illustrates differences between the semantics in the face of positive and negative occurrences of the modal operator.
Example 6.1. Consider the logic program P:
and the FO theory = {p(b)}. We note here that the signature of P contains only one function symbol, the constant constant a. Consequently, UNA P = ∅.
ι EB ( , P) has one stable E expansion T E and one stable A expansion T
A . T E contains q(a), but not q(b); both contain p(b), but not p(a). Consider an interpretation w
, and w |= r, and a variable assignment B such that x B = k. Then, β = {x/a} is an associated name substitution and q(x)β ∈ T E , and so (w, B) |= E T E Lq(x). Another associated name substitution is β = {x/b}, and so
, and thus r / ∈ T E . One can straightforwardly argue that ι EB ( , P) |= E T s(b), and therefore s(b) ∈ T E . Consider an interpretation w that is like w, except that k ∈ s I and w |= r. Since T In order to avoid a proliferation of results, following Konolige [1991] , we concentrate in this section on the any-name semantics. In the following section we discuss our results in the light of the standard names assumption, for which the any-and all-name semantics coincide. In our analysis we consider the same syntactic classes of programs as in the previous section, and we consider the following classes of objective theories: The order diagram is as follows (arrows stand for set inclusion):
A does not contain p(a), (w , B) |=

A T A L p(x). T A does not contain q(b), but (w, B) |=
For all pairs of classes of logic programs and FO theories, we determine the relationships between stable expansions of different combinations ι
γ ( , P) at different levels of granularity. As in Section 5.1, we concentrate here on correspondences of stable expansions ≡ E x ; they imply that relative to the class x of formulas, the embeddings τ (∨) χ (P) and τ (∨) γ (P) are interchangeable in combinations. In Section 6.1 we state our main result on the relationships between stable expansions of combinations and make several observations. In Section 6.2 we establish the partial results necessary for deriving our main result. The proofs of the partial results can be found in the Appendix.
Relationships Between Stable Expansions of Combinations
Our results are summarized in Table I , which gives a complete picture of the correspondences, where each entry represents a most general correspondence, that is, neither the correspondence ≡ E x nor the logic program or FO theory class may be relaxed. This is formally stated in the main theorem of this section (Theorem 6.2). In brief, our central results are that several of the embeddings become interchangeable when considering positive normal programs combined with gHorn or Horn theories (cf., Proposition 6.3) as well as the correspondences for combinations with ground logic programs, even allowed to contain negation (cf., the rightmost column of Table I ).
We call 1 ≡ Table I by trivial inferences, where
. Let X be a class of FO theories, let Y be a class of programs, and let
We will establish the results of Table I and provide some intuitive explanations about partial results in the next section.
Note that removing any statement from Table I ( , P) , and for every ( , P) ∈ Horn×nLP such that P is positive,
This result does not extend to the disjunctive embeddings, because there are no PIA axioms for the atoms involving names not in P, and it does not extend to more general formulas (cf., e.g., Example 4.2).
We make the following further observations.
-The various combinations behave differently in the general case. Only two of them, ι EH and ι ∨ EH , are always equivalent (they coincide on normal programs). -For combinations with arbitrary FO theories, further correspondences are only present for ground logic programs in some cases. Narrowing to any of the classes that allow predicates of arity > 0 (Horn, gHorn, Uni ) does not change the picture. -For arbitrary logic programs, only in case of propositional theories do some combinations behave equivalently. Requiring safety leads only for propositional theories, and in one case (ι EB and ι EH ) to a stronger correspondence. -Uni and Horn show no most general correspondences, which means that with respect to more general or more restrictive classes, their change in syntax does not affect equivalence. -In contrast, the important class gHorn has maximal correspondences for ground programs. Thus, for combinations with FO theories from the classes Horn, gHorn, We illustrate the use of the result in Theorem 6.2 with an example. Note that if the stable expansions of two embeddings or combinations correspond with respect to a certain class formulas, then the embeddings, respectively, combinations, also agree on autoepistemic consequences for these classes.
Example 6.4. Consider P = {q(a); p(x); r(x) ← not s(x), p(x)} from Example 4.4, which is neither safe nor ground. Hence, to determine correspondence between embeddings, we use the first column of Table I . As P is normal, all equations in the column are applicable. We have that, for example,
, and τ HP (P) ≡ E oga τ EB (P). Let be a propositional theory; then we also have
. Furthermore, we can conclude that ι EB (P) and ι EH (P), and also ι ∨ HP (P) and ι ∨ EB (P), agree on objective ground autoepistemic consequences.
Derivation of the Results
We start with the positive results. Trivially, ι EH and ι ∨ EH coincide for arbitrary FO theories, and the the equivalence results for empty in Table I carry over from the respective results on embeddings in Section 5.
We show that for ground programs, the τ EB and τ EH embeddings are interchangeable in any combination with an FO theory.
Intuitively, this holds because only named individuals matter in rules, and hence the modal atoms Lh in embedded rule heads do not matter. However, this does not generalize from ground to safe programs, as the evaluation of literals ¬L p(x) in the rule bodies does not amount to grounding (see Proposition 6.10(6.10)). Also, the τ ∨ HP and τ ∨ EH embeddings are interchangeable in combinations with arbitrary FO theories if the logic program is ground.
The reason is that we can eliminate all modal atoms Lb from rule bodies with the PIA axioms in ι ∨ EB ( , P) and obtain ι ∨ HP ( , P). Such elimination is not possible in the nonground case, since the PIAs only apply to atoms from P .
Moving now to fragments of FoL, that is, down the rows in Table I , we first have the following. Intuitively, in the first case, we can add modal atoms Lb in the bodies and Lh in the heads of τ HP (P) by the PIA axioms, thereby obtaining ι ∨ EH ( , P). To go from τ EH to τ HP is possible if is not disjunctive with respect to atoms h. This is the case for a Horn , and similarly for a generalized Horn , as we can apply skolemization. In the second case, there are no PIA axioms, but we can similarly apply skolemization and obtain a disjunction-free theory that is Horn modulo modal atoms. Skolemization does not work for nonground programs in this case, as previously unnamed individuals are named by Skolem terms.
We note that, combined with previous results, we can infer from Proposition 6.7 that Theorem 5.3 generalizes from embeddings to combinations with generalized Horn theories for the case of ground logic programs.
For propositional theories, we obtain a result symmetric to Proposition 6.6 for arbitrary logic programs. 
It turns out that the results in the preceding propositions cannot be extended to more general classes of programs or theories, or larger subsets of stable expansions. PROPOSITION 6.10. There are pairs ( , P) in
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2. Correctness of the table (i.e., the '⇐' direction of the theorem) follows from the fact that τ EH (P) and τ ∨ EH (P) are identical for normal programs P (thus ι EH ( , P) = ι ∨ EH ( , P)), Theorem 5.3, Propositions 6.5-6.9, the inclusion relations between the classes of programs and FO theories, and the properties of the ≡ E x relation. Completeness (i.e., the '⇒' direction) is shown analogously by exploiting the counterexamples in Proposition 6.10. We can verify with little yet tedious effort that the table is complete and that no entries can be relaxed (e.g., using a simple logic program).
APPLICATION TO THE SEMANTIC WEB
The original motivation for our work was the interest of combinations of rules and ontologies in the Semantic Web. Below, we illustrate how our results may be applied in this context. Briefly, some uses are -to capture the semantics of proposed combinations in a uniform language; -to derive properties of such and other combinations; -to design semantics for combinations, such that the ontology and rule parts are faithfully captured, and controlling the effect of aspects like grounding and working with open vs. closed domains.
We note that, apart from an obvious relationship to the open vs. closed domain issue, grounding rules is important from a practical perspective, since many rule engines in use today employ grounding. In fact, powerful rule engines like smodels, 6 DLV, 7 and clasp, 8 along with many others that offer stable and/or well-founded semantics are essentially based on evaluation of ground programs. Thus, aspects such as the invariance of a combination with respect to grounding the rules prior to evaluation (formally captured in Definition 7.1, below) are also important from a practical perspective.
We concentrate on two prominent Semantic Web languages, namely (i) RDF and its extension RDF Schema (RDFS) [RDF Concepts 2004] ; and (ii) OWL DL (Version 2) [OWL 2 2009] . For reasons of clarity we restrict ourselves to normal programs.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the combinations ι χ , which are defined as ι χ ( , P) = ∪ τ χ (P), with χ ∈ {HP , EB , EH }, where is an FO theory (the ontology) and P is a normal logic program.
Grounding Invariance and Closed Domains
In order to state our results for RDF and OWL concerning grounding and open vs. closed domains, we first formally define grounding invariance and closed domain semantics. In the following, X is a class of FO theories and Y is a class of normal logic programs.
When speaking about open and closed domain semantics in the context of combinations of rules and ontologies, we are interested in the effective domain of quantification of the variables in the rules. In the open domain semantics, variables quantify over arbitrary domains, while, in the closed domain semantics, variables quantify over a fixed domain, for example, the set of ground terms obtained from the constants and function symbols appearing in the rules or ontologies.
Recall that, given a normal program P and a rule r ∈ P, the embedding τ χ (r) is a formula of the form (∀) b r ⊃ h r . Definition 7.2. A combination ι χ is closed-domain for X , Y if, for every ( , P) ∈ X × Y and every stable expansion T of ι χ ( , P), the following property holds: For every interpretation w such that w |= E T ι χ ( , P) and variable assignment B, whenever w, B |= E T b r for some rule r ∈ P, then B assigns every variable x in r to a named individual, that is, x B = t I , for some name t.
Essentially, a combination is a closed domain if rules can only be applied (i.e., the body is satisfied in a model and variable assignment) if all variables are assigned to named individuals. We have that combinations involving only ground logic programs are trivially closeddomain. Of particular interest to combinations of rules and ontologies on the Semantic Web are DL-safe programs , which yield grounding invariance (for positive programs), thereby effectively imposing a closed-domain semantics. An atom p( t) is a rule atom if p appears only in P. We call the program P DL-safe if P is safe and every variable in every rule r of P appears in a rule atom in B + (r). The next propositions follow straightforwardly from the proof of Proposition 6.3. PROPOSITION 7.5. Let be a gHorn theory and P a DL-safe positive normal program. Observe that this result, combined with Proposition 7.4, shows that closed-domain does not imply grounding invariance. In contrast, Proposition 7.3 shows that the converse effectively holds, as long as one is interesting only in ground atoms.
A weaker notion of safety, namely weak DL-safety [Rosati 2006 ] (see also Section 9.2.2) also plays an important role in the Semantic Web context, due to the possibility to write conjunctive queries over DL ontologies. A program P is weakly DL-safe, if it is safe and for every rule r and every variable x in r, x either appears only in nonrule atoms in B + (r) or x appears in a rule atom in B + (r). As weak DL-safety is stronger than ordinary safety, clearly Proposition 7.6(7.6) and Proposition 7.6(7.6) extend to weakly DL-safe programs. However, Proposition 7.6(7.6) does not, and the same also happens to Proposition 7.5. PROPOSITION 7.8. There is a pair ( , P) ∈ gHorn × snLP such that P is weakly DL-safe and positive, ι HP ( , P) ≡ E oga ι EB ( , P), and ι HP ( , P) ≡ E oga ι EH ( , P). PROOF. Consider = {∃x. p(x)} and P = {q ← p(x)}: ι HP ( , P) allows to conclude q, whereas ι EB ( , P) and ι EH ( , P) do not.
RDF, RDF Schema, and Rules
Recall that RDF is the basic data description language of the Semantic Web, in which atomic statements have the form triple (subject, predicate, object) . RDFS has further axioms about the meaning of certain triples; for example, that the facts triple(a, rdfs:subClassOf , b) and triple(b, rdfs:subClassOf , c) imply triple(a, rdfs:subClassOf , c).
As shown by de Bruijn and Heymans [2007] , (finite) RDF graphs S are essentially gHorn theories of the form = {∃ x. S} ∪ , where the free variables in S are among x, and is a set of function-free Horn logic formulas that capture the RDFS semantics [RDF Semantics 2004] .
Combinations of RDF graphs with rules-for example, the RIF RDF and OWL compatibility recommendation [RIF RDF-OWL 2009] and Jena 9 -are common, due to the flexibility to manipulate data that the rules offer. Note that in this context it is not possible to make a strict separation between ontology and rule predicates, as the triple predicate is "defined" by both the ontology and the rules.
Current combinations of RDFS with rules are typically limited to positive Horn rules-a notable exception being the work by Analyti et al. [2008] . For example, the RIF-RDFS [RIF RDF-OWL 2009] semantics essentially defines the combination of an RDF graph and a set of positive normal rules P as the first-order logic theory ι HP ( , P) = ∪ τ HP (P).
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This semantics can be extended straightforwardly to normal rules P by interpreting the FO-AEL theory ∪τ HP (P) using the any-or all-name semantics. Such an extension keeps the spirit of the RIF-RDFS semantics by having an open domain, that is, not only the constants, but also the existentially quantified variables in the RDF graphs matter (see also Proposition 7.4).
However, rules typically have a closed-domain semantics. Thus we may argue that combinations should respect this semantics and enforce a closed domain in the interaction between the RDF statements and the rules; examples of such combinations are ∪ τ χ (gr(P)) and ∪ τ EH (P): the former enforces closing of the domain through grounding, while the latter forces closing through the use of the modal operator L in the rules (cf., Propositions 7.3 and 7.4). Note that, by Theorem 6.2, the embeddings τ HP , τ EB , and τ EH may be used interchangeably in the combination ∪ τ χ (gr(P)) (as long as we are only interested in ground atomic consequences), as is in gHorn and gr(P) is in gnLP. The following example illustrates the difference between combinations with open and with closed domain semantics, respectively. Example 7.9. Consider the RDF graph = {∃x.triple(x, director, TheGodfather)} ∪ encoding the fact that there is a director of the film "The Godfather." Consider also the program P = {hasDirector (x) ← triple(y, director, x)} encoding that whenever someone directs a film, then this film has a director. We have
Clearly, hasDirector (TheGodFather) is a consequence of ∪τ HP (P), but not of ∪τ EH (P), as there is no constant c such that triple(c, director, TheGodFather) is included in the single stable expansion of ∪ τ EH (P). Similarly, hasDirector (TheGodFather) is not a consequence of ∪ τ χ (gr(P)), since there is no constant representing the director. Proposition 7.6 shows that grounding P or not, prior to combination with , does not matter if is an RDF graph without blank nodes (since then is in Horn) and P is positive-in particular, ∪ τ χ (gr(P)) ≡ E oga ∪ τ χ (P). Similarly for τ EB and τ EH , if is an arbitrary RDF graph and P is safe and positive. If moreover P is DL-safe (see Section 7.1), this invariance under grounding for arbitrary RDF graphs and safe positive programs also extends to the τ HP embedding, and thus τ EB , τ EH , and τ HP are all interchangeable. We furthermore have that the open and closed domain semantics coincide in the cases mentioned in this paragraph.
If S is an RDF graph, we define ι χ (S, P) = ∪ τ χ (P), where = {∃ x. S} ∪ , as before. An RDF graph S is ground if it does not contain free variables. Such a graph is equivalent to the Horn theory = { S} ∪ . From Propositions 7.5 and 7.6 we then obtain the following corollary. 
A notable further consequence of Proposition 7.6 is the following observation concerning the standard RIF-RDFS semantics [RIF RDF-OWL 2009].
COROLLARY 7.11. The RIF-RDFS combination semantics fulfills grounding invariance for DL-safe positive normal programs.
For a possible use case scenario, suppose the ontology is a ground RDF graph. Now suppose the user wants to add a set of DL-safe positive normal rules and to follow the standard RIF-RDFS combination semantics [RIF RDF-OWL 2009] . If the user is only interested in ground atomic consequences, Corollary 7.11 tells us that this semantics is invariant under grounding, and thus essentially closed-domain, by Proposition 7.3. Even when extending the graph with variables, the combination remains invariant under grounding, and thus closed-domain. However, grounding invariance may be lost when extending the program with negation, by Proposition 7.7.
OWL DL and Rules
The Web Ontology Language OWL DL is based on Description Logics (DLs); Version 1 [OWL Semantics 2004] is based on the DL SHOIN and Version 2 [OWL 2 2009] on the DL SROIQ. Both DLs can be viewed as subsets of first-order logic [Sattler et al. 2003 ]. An influential proposal for combining OWL DL ontologies with positive normal rules is the Semantic Web Rules Language (SWRL) [Horrocks et al. 2004 ], which gives a standard first-order semantics to their union.
A SWRL theory consists of a set of DL axioms and a set of Horn-like formulas. We obtain the following correspondence with ι HP combinations. PROPOSITION 7.12. Let be a SWRL theory. Then, there is an FO theory and a safe positive normal logic program P such that |= α iff α is a consequence of ι HP ( , P), for every objective ground atom α.
An approach similar to SWRL was adopted by the RIF working group for positive normal RIF rules [RIF RDF-OWL 2009] . If is the FOL-equivalent of an OWL DL ontology and P is a set of positive normal rules, the semantics of RIF-OWL DL combinations is given by the FO theory ι HP ( , P) = ∪ τ HP (P). Proposition 7.12 implies that this is equivalent to SWRL.
Regarding open vs. closed domains, similar considerations as in Section 7.2 apply to combinations of OWL DL with rules:
∪ τ HP (P) yields an open domain, while ∪ τ χ (gr(P)) and ∪ τ EH (P) yield a closed domain on the rule side (see Example 7.9). However, interchangeability and invariance of the embeddings τ HP , τ EB , and τ EH under grounding may not be guaranteed, as need not be in gHorn.
Example 7.13. Consider = {A(a), ∀x.A(x) ⊃ B(x)∨C(x)}, which captures a simple OWL DL ontology, and P = {q ← B(x); q ← C(x)}. Now,
We have that q is a consequence of ∪ τ HP (gr(P)), but not of ∪ τ EH (gr(P)), since neither B(a) nor C(a) is included in the single stable expansion of ∪ τ EH (gr(P)).
There are important fragments of OWL DL that are essentially included in gHorn, such as the OWL 2 profiles EL, QL, and RL [OWL 2 Profiles 2009], and the fragment corresponding to Horn-SHIQ [Hustadt et al. 2005] . As the case with RDF, when considering the combination ∪ τ χ (gr(P)) (see Propositions 7.5 and 7.6), the embeddings τ HP , τ EB , and τ EH may be used interchangeably, and, for safe positive programs, τ EB and τ EH are invariant under grounding. Furthermore, OWL 2 RL is essentially in Horn. Therefore, when considering combinations of OWL 2 RL ontologies with positive normal programs, ι HP ( , P), ι EB ( , P), and ι EH ( , P) may be used interchangeably, by Proposition 6.3, and the combinations are invariant under grounding of the rules, by Proposition 7.6. Moreover, they are closed-domain.
As shown by Motik et al. [2005] , reasoning with OWL DL plus DL-safe rules (i.e., SWRL having DL-safe rules) is decidable. From Propositions 7.5 and 7.6, we obtain the following corollary. Here, OWL gHorn theories are theories of OWL 2 EL, OWL 2 QL, OWL 2 RL, or Horn-SHIQ. 
Consider a scenario in which the ontology is in both OWL 2 RL and OWL 2 EL and we want to add positive rules that are safe (but not DL-safe), using the standard RIF-OWL combination semantics [RIF RDF-OWL 2009] . Corollary 7.14 tells us that we may employ any of the considered combinations ι χ and may ground the rules, as long as we are only interested in atomic formulas. However, if we were to extend the ontology towards full OWL 2 EL by introducing existentially quantified variables (also called someValuesFrom restrictions in OWL) and we want to stay faithful to the RIF-OWL combination semantics, we may no longer use the ι EB or ι EH combinations, as illustrated by Example 7.9. In addition, we may not ground the rules prior to reasoning. Therefore, if such a future extension towards OWL 2 EL is likely, we should choose the ι HP embedding rather than ι EB or ι EH , and should not rely on grounding for reasoning.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss implications of our results. We first discuss consequences for the relationships between the embeddings and make a number of observations about those relationships. We then discuss how the results in this article can be used in the context of combining classical theories (ontologies) with logic programs (rules)-specifically, how the embeddings studied in this article can be used as building blocks for such combinations. Finally, we discuss our choice of FO-AEL as the underlying formalism and compare the semantics for quantification (quantifying-in) with other approaches to quantifying-in in autoepistemic logic [Levesque 1990; Levesque and Lakemeyer 2000; Kaminski and Rey 2002] .
Relationships Between the Embeddings
Using the results obtained in Sections 5 and 6, we can make a number of observations about the embeddings.
(1) The differences between the embeddings by themselves do not depend on the use of negation in the program. Generally speaking, the differences originate from the positive use of the modal operator in the antecedent and the consequent and the use of the PIA axioms. However, in combinations with FO theories, the interaction between names in the theories for which there are no UNA axioms and negation in the rules gives rise to different behaviors by the embeddings (see Proposition 6.10(4)). (2) The stable expansions of embeddings with and without the PIAs generally tend to differ. However, we can note that the former are generally stronger in terms of autoepistemic consequences (cf., Figure 1 and Example 4.14). (3) The embeddings τ HP and τ ∨ HP are generally the strongest in terms of consequences (see Figure 1) , when compared to other embeddings without and with PIAs, respectively. They allow us to derive the contrapositive of rules (cf., Example 4.2) and the bodies of rules are applicable to unnamed individuals, whereas the antecedents of the axioms in the other embeddings are only applicable to named individuals, due to the positive modal atoms in the bodies. that lack UNA axioms and rules in a program P do not interact (e.g., is propositional or P is ground), then τ EB and τ EH are, in most cases, interchangeable.
Special care needs to be taken if we select an embedding that includes the PIA axioms (i.e., τ ∨ HP and τ ∨ EB ). These axioms of the form α ⊃ Lα ensure that α or ¬α is included in every stable expansion for every ground atom of P . Note that the PIA axioms have no effect when considering individuals that are not named by ground terms in P .
The UNA axioms in embeddings, which serve to make individuals different by default, may interact with the FO theory in a combination. For example, consider P = {p(a); p(b)} and = {a = b ⊃ r, a = c ⊃ s}. Then, every stable expansion of ι χ ( , P), for any embedding τ χ we considered, contains r, as a = b is concluded by default, but not s (as c is unknown in P). To shortcut such (possibly undesired) inequality transfers from P to , the unique names or even the standard names assumption may be adopted a priori. Recall that the results on the embeddings in Section 4 were obtained by stepping through the standard names assumption, and thus they also hold under the unique names or standard names assumption, as shown by de Bruijn et al. [2008] . On the one hand, this should extend to the positive results about correspondences in Sections 5 and 6, whose proofs rely on named interpretations and no equalities between individuals are enforced. On the other hand, some counterexamples for correspondences fail, including those for the first item in Lemma 5.13 and Proposition 6.10(6.10), and thus further correspondences may hold. An in-depth study of the effect of unique names and standard names assumptions on the correspondences and differences between the embeddings is an interesting subject for further work.
Different Embeddings and Combinations
Recall the general setting for combining a first-order theory and a logic program P in a unifying formalism (FO-AEL) which we sketched in the Introduction. The combination operator ι takes as arguments the theory and the program P and returns an FO-AEL theory ι( , P). The operator provides two embedding functions: σ and τ map first-order theories, respectively logic programs, to FO-AEL theories. We also mentioned that in the simplest case the combination is the union of the two individual embeddings: ι( , P) = σ ( ) ∪ τ (P).
In Section 4 we investigated several candidates for the embedding function for logic programs, τ . All these embedding functions are faithful, in the sense that the stable models of the program P correspond to the sets of objective ground atomic formulas in the stable expansions of the embedding τ (P). In Section 5 we investigated the relationships between the stable expansions of these embeddings when considering more general formulas. It turned out that there are already significant differences between the expansions when considering nonground or nonatomic formulas. Now, in Section 6, we investigated the relationships between the expansions when considering combinations of the embeddings with first-order theories. We have found that, under certain circumstances, namely, when the first-order theory and program are of particular shapes and we are interested in a particular kind of formula (e.g., ground formulas), certain embeddings can be used interchangeably (cf., Table I ). For example, if the program is normal and ground (P ∈ gnLP), the theory is generalized Horn ( ∈ gHorn), and we are interested in objective formulas, we can use the embeddings τ EB and τ EH interchangeably: ι EB ≡ ι EH for P ∈ gnLP and ∈ FoL, according to Table  I , as Horn ⊆ FoL and the set of objective formulas is a subset of the set of formulas.
Our results are not limited to combinations of the form ι( , P) = ∪τ
is one of the embeddings investigated in this article. We could imagine adding axioms to or rules to P to achieve the desired interoperation between the two components, or even changing the axioms or rules (e.g., by grounding), obtaining a first-order theory and program P . In this more general setting, the combination is defined as
χ (P ), where and P are obtained from and P by adding and/or replacing axioms and rules. The results of Section 6 can be applied, provided that and P are in the respective classes of theories and programs, independent of the shapes of and P (see also Section 7).
As discussed in Section 4, embeddings that include the UNA axioms are not modular in general, but only signature-modular. This can be remedied by using the single axiom instead,
which has the same effect for embeddings. However, using this axiom would entail default uniqueness on all names in a combination, not only those from the signature of the program (if desired, such default uniqueness can be easily accomplished by just mentioning respective terms in the logic program). As a consequence, the combinations also behave differently.
Quantifying-in in First-Order Autoepistemic Logic
We consider here FO-AEL, with the semantics for quantifying-in as defined by Konolige [1991] ; as an underlying formalism for combinations of first-order theories and logic programs. However, further semantics for quantifying-in have been proposed in the literature. Levesque [1990] defined the logic of only knowing (see also the subsequent work by Levesque and Lakemeyer [2000] ), which is essentially a superset of FO-AEL. Levesque's semantics for quantifying-in is slightly different from that of Konolige [1991] which we used in this article. He adopted a standard names assumption that amounts to a special case of the notion in Section 2.1; there is a countably infinite number of constant symbols in the language, but there are no (other) function symbols. Likewise, the variant of FO-AEL by Kaminski and Rey [2002] also employs a standard names assumption, although under a somewhat different guise: the domain of every interpretation is an extended Herbrand interpretation, that is, it is a superset of the set of constant symbols in the theory; function symbols are not considered. The semantics of Konolige does not impose such restrictions, for example, the domain may be infinite, while the number of constants is finite, and function symbols are allowed.
It is well known that reasoning in standard first-order logic can be reduced to reasoning in first-order logic with the standard names assumption, as long as there are sufficiently many constant symbols available [Fitting 1996] . Different from Levesque [1990] , Kaminski and Rey [2002] did not consider equality in the language. However, equality in first-order logic with standard names behaves quite differently from equality in standard first-order logic. In the latter case, two constant symbols may be interpreted as the same element in the domain, whereas in the former case, all constant symbols are interpreted distinctly, for example, a = b cannot be satisfied if a and b are distinct constant symbols.
11 It is, however, possible to reduce reasoning in standard first-order logic with equality to reasoning in firstorder logic with standard names using a special congruence predicate [Fitting 1996, Theorem 9.3.9] . Motik and Rosati [2007] use such a predicate in their variant of the logic MKNF [Lifschitz 1991; 1994] , as do de Bruijn et al. [2008] in a variant of FO-AEL with standard names; see Section 9.2 for further discussion about this work.
RELATED WORK
We review here two areas of related work: extensions of logic programming and description logic semantics with open domains and nonmonotonicity, respectively, and approaches to combining rules and ontologies.
Extensions of LP and DL Semantics
We have studied the combination of logic programs and ontologies using embeddings in a unifying formalism (FO-AEL). We could imagine, in contrast, extensions of the semantics of logic programs or ontologies to incorporate (parts of) the other formalism. One such extension of logic programming semantics is that of open domains [Gelfond and Przymusinska 1993] . Such extended semantics can be used to accommodate incomplete knowledge, an important aspect of ontology languages.
Van Belleghem et al. [1997] define open logic programs, which are combinations of sets of rules and first-order logic formulas; the set of predicate symbols is partitioned into a set of open and a set of closed predicates. The semantics of the program is the first-order theory consisting of Clark's completion of the closed predicates and the firstorder formulas in the open program. They then discuss how description logics can be embedded in such open logic programs and then discuss the correspondence between abduction in open programs and reasoning in description logics. Heymans et al. [2006] Heymans et al. [2008] show how OASP can be used for combinations of rules and ontologies, following the DL+log semantics [Rosati 2006 ] (see Section 9.2).
Recently, Calì et al. [2009] presented Datalog ± as a language that, similarly to OASP, can be used to enhance ontologies with rules. In essence, Datalog ± amounts to a skolemized form of gHorn in a relational setting, where decidability rules must satisfy a guardedness condition. As reported by Calì et al., various DLs can be encoded into Datalog ± , and thus, as in OASP, combination of rules and ontologies can be achieved by adding rules to this encoding. Furthermore, Calì et al. present a semantics for Datalog ± programs with stratified negation that generalizes the usual notion of stratified programs, which enables combinations with nonmonotonic rules. An embedding of (stratified) Datalog ± into FO-AEL via the embedding τ HP seems easy, such that its (operational) semantics can be reconstructed in logical terms, as well as the combination with the DLs. Moreover, the embedding can be used to give semantics to unstratified Datalog ± programs via FO-AEL, and the results of this article can be exploited to derive properties. Investigating this in detail remains for future work.
Several nonmonotonic extensions of description logics have been defined in the literature [Baader and Hollunder 1995; Donini et al. 2002; Bonatti et al. 2006] . These might be further extended to accommodate logic programs by well-known correspondences of the latter to nonmonotonic formalisms. Extensions of DL semantics with defaults and circumscription have been described in more detail by Baader and Hollunder [1995] and Bonatti et al. [2006] , respectively. Extensions with nonmonotonic modal operators, inspired by the logic MKNF [Lifschitz 1991 ], have been described by . Both works mention a notion of procedural or default rules, which are rules involving description logic concepts. allow rules of the form C ⇒ D, where C and D are DL concepts (i.e., unary predicates); such rules are intuitively read "if an individual is proved to be an instance of C, then derive that it is also an instance of D". The default rules considered by Donini et al. [2002] are a generalization; they are of the form C 0 , not C 1 , . . . , not C n ⇒ D, n ≥ 0, where all C i and D are DL concepts. Intuitively, "if an individual is proved to be an instance of C 0 and is not proved to be an instance of C 1 , . . . , or C n , then derive that it is also an instance of D". The work of Donini et al. inspired some more advanced formalisms for combining rules and ontologies, which we consider next.
Combinations of Rules and Ontologies
Roughly speaking, we can distinguish between three kinds of combinations of rules and ontologies: (1) uniform combinations (e.g., CARIN [Levy and Rousset 1998 ] and SWRL [Horrocks et al. 2005] ); (2) hybrid combinations (e.g., dl-programs and DL+log [Rosati 2006 ]); and (3) embedding combinations (e.g., the MKNF combination by Motik and Rosati [2007] and a combination based on quantified equilibrium logic ); for more discussion, see, for example, the works of Eiter et al. [2008] and de Bruijn et al. [2006] . We also note the recent approach by de Bruijn et al. [2008] for embeddings of dl-programs, DL+log, and MKNF into FO-AEL.
9.2.1. Uniform Combinations. With uniform combinations we mean combinations of ontologies that are essentially classical first-order theories and of Horn logic formulas that are essentially positive rules. The combined theory, which is the set-theoretic union of the formulas in the ontology and the Horn formulas, is interpreted under the standard first-order logic semantics.
In the CARIN approach [Levy and Rousset 1998 ], the ontologies are theories of the description logic ALCN R and the rules are Datalog rules, that is, safe positive normal rules as defined in Section 2.2, with the further restriction that predicates which occur in the ontology may not be used in rule heads. Levy and Rousset show that reasoning with these combinations is undecidable in general, but becomes decidable when suitably restricting either the ontology or the rules. As discussed in Section 7, Motik et al. [2005] demonstrated decidability of SWRL-the combination of OWL DL with normal positive rules-restricted to DL-safe rules.
9.2.2. Hybrid Combinations. Hybrid approaches combine logic programs with nonmonotonic negation (usually under the stable model semantics or the well-founded semantics) with a description logic knowledge base or, in more abstract terms, theories in first-order logic. The two most prominent such approaches are dl-programs and DL+log [Rosati 2006 ]. The main difference between them is the way in which the interaction between the individual components (the logic program and the ontology) is managed. For both, we assume that the ontology component is a DL theory and the logic program is function-free and safe.
In dl-programs, the interoperation between the program and the ontology is achieved by DL queries, which are queries to the DL ontology, in the bodies of the rules; prior to evaluation, information from the program may be temporarily added to the ontology for a query. Eiter et al. [2008] show that query answering in dl-programs is decidable as long as reasoning in the individual components (ontology and logic program) is decidable. HEX-programs [Eiter et al. 2005 ] generalize dl-programs to more general external evaluations that are not limited to queries on DL ontologies.
DL+log makes a distinction between ontology and rule predicates; rule predicates may not occur in the ontology, but the ontology predicates may occur in the rules. The combination is interpreted by a single first-order interpretation, but the part of the interpretation concerned with the rule predicates is subject to stability conditions corresponding to the usual definition of stable models. Thus, the interoperation is based on single models, resulting in a broad interface between the program and the ontology. Rosati [2005] shows that if the rules are DL-safe and satisfiability checking in the ontology component is decidable, then reasoning with the combination is decidable. Rosati [2006] shows that reasoning is decidable if the problem of containment of conjunctive queries in unions of conjunctive queries is decidable for the underlying DL, provided that the rules are weakly DL-safe; this notion dispenses DL-safety for variables that occur only in ontology predicates in rule bodies, which makes it possible to access unnamed individuals in rules. AL-log ] can be seen as a precursor of DL+log that considers only positive programs and that allows (unary) ontology predicates only in rule bodies and effectively requires DL-safety. The differences between the underlying principles of dl-programs and DL+log are discussed in more detail by de Bruijn et al. [2006] .
Since we did not distinguish between rule and ontology predicates in our embeddings-indeed, in the introduction we claimed this is undesirable-there is no straightforward correspondence between any of the embeddings we considered and the hybrid approaches we mentioned. The embeddings we considered in this article can be used to construct combinations that have a tight integration between the components and do not have a separation between ontology and rules predicates. In fact, the DL+log approach can be reconstructed by an extension of simple combinations ι χ ( , P) = ∪ P with classical interpretation axioms, which, loosely speaking, fix the value of classical predicates for stable expansions; we refer to de Bruijn et al. [2008] for details.
9.2.3. Embedding Combinations. Motik and Rosati [2007] propose a combination of DL ontologies and nonmonotonic logic programs through an embedding into the bimodal nonmonotonic logic MKNF [Lifschitz 1991 ], which uses the modal operators K, which stands for "knowledge," and not for "negation as failure". The variant of MKNF used by Motik and Rosati employs a standard names assumption similar to the approach of Levesque [1990] : there is a one-to-one correspondence between the countably many constant symbols in the language and elements in the domains of interpretations (functions symbols are not considered). The equality symbol of first-order logic (=) is embedded using a special binary predicate symbol ≈ and the usual congruence axioms [Fitting 1996, Ch. 9] are added. Logic programs are embedded into MKNF using the transformation described by Lifschitz [1994] : a rule r of form (1) is embedded as the formula
A classical theory is embedded as a conjunction comprising all the formulas in the theory, preceded by the modal operator K: σ MKNF ( ) = K( ). Finally, the combination of the logic program P and the first-order theory is simply ι MKNF = τ MKNF (P) ∪ {σ MKNF ( )}.
Comparing τ MKNF to the embeddings in Section 4, we can see that it is close in spirit to the embedding τ ∨ EH ; both embeddings feature modal belief operators in front of positive atoms in both the body and the head of the rule. In fact, it turns out that, when using a variant of FO-AEL with standard names, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the stable expansions of τ ∨− EH (P) and the MKNF models of τ MKNF (P) (recall that τ ∨− EH (P) is τ ∨ EH (P) without the UNA axioms); however, this correspondence does not extend to combinations with FO theories, as shown by de Bruijn et al. [2008] .
Besides the obvious differences between MKNF and autoepistemic logic-illustrated by the differences between the τ MKNF and τ ∨− EH embedding functions-there is a difference in the semantics for quantifying-in between the variant of MKNF used by Motik and Rosati [2007] and Konolige's any-and all-name semantics that we used in this article. Since FO-AEL permits arbitrary interpretations, we needed to utilize UNA axioms. Motik and Rosati employ the standard names assumption, and hence do not need such axioms.
As already pointed out, de Bruijn et al. [2007] used another nonmonotonic logic for combining ontologies and logic programs, namely quantified equilibrium logic (QEL) [Pearce and Valverde 2005] . While FO-AEL and MKNF are nonmonotonic modal logics, QEL is based on the nonclassical logic of here-and-there, which is an intermediate logic between classical and intuitionistic logic. Negation in QEL is nonmonotonic; however, by axiomatizing the law of the excluded middle (LEM) through ∀ x( p( x) ∨ ¬p( x)), we can enforce that a predicate p is interpreted classically, and negation of this predicate becomes classical. Actually, de Bruijn et al. [2007] used a slightly generalized version of QEL that does not assume uniqueness of names and includes equality, to show that the QEL theory obtained by adding such LEM axioms to the combination ι( , P) = ∪ P of a FO theory and a logic program P yields the DL+log semantics.
CONCLUSION
We have defined various embeddings of nonground programs into first-order autoepistemic logic (FO-AEL) that generalize the respective embeddings of propositional logic programs into standard AEL, and we have investigated their semantic properties. We have shown that these embeddings are faithful, in the sense that the stable models (or answer sets) of a given nonground logic program P are in one-to-one correspondence to the stable expansions of the embeddings τ (∨) χ (P) with respect to objective ground atomic formulas. Furthermore, we have analyzed the correspondences between the embeddings at more fine-grained levels, revealing their commonalities and differences.
Our results provide a basis and a stepping stone for the more complex endeavor to combine classical knowledge bases and nonground logic programs in a uniform logical formalism (which is one of the targets of the Semantic Web architecture), namely the well-known and amply studied formalism of autoepistemic logic. Indeed, since the combination of positive RIF rules with RDF and OWL DL [RIF RDF-OWL 2009] corresponds to one of the combinations we studied, our results are directly applicable to such combinations.
In this direction, we have investigated correspondences between simple combinations of embeddings of logic programs with FO theories for various classes of logic programs and FO theories. The results of our investigation provide useful insights into the behavior of different embeddings for logic programs with respect to a context, given by a first-order theory, and allows some conclusions about the replaceability of one embedding by another without altering the behavior of the combination. Based on the results in this article, more elaborated combinations of logic programs with FO theories were investigated by de Bruijn et al. [2008] , showing how well-known approaches to combining rules and ontologies in the Semantic Web context can be embedded into FO-AEL, like those of Eiter et al. [2008] , Rosati [2006] , and Motik and Rosati [2007] . Notably, the DL+log approach can be embedded into FO-AEL by adding further axioms to the simple combination that we have considered here.
Several issues remain for future work. In the present article, we focused on semantic aspects of embeddings of logic programs, but we did not address computational issues. Since the embeddings are easily computed, they may be exploited to establish decidable fragments of combinations of rules and ontologies, and to craft sound (but possibly incomplete) algorithms for specific reasoning tasks for such combinations. There are several promising starting points for devising algorithms for computing stable expansions and/or autoepistemic consequences in FO-AEL. Niemelä [1992] presents a general procedure for computing stable expansions in FO-AEL without quantifyingin. Levesque and Lakemeyer [2000] present a sound, but incomplete proof theory for the logic of only knowing, which extends FO-AEL with standard names. Finally, Rosati [1999] presents techniques for reasoning with first-order MKNF (with standard names) with a limited form of quantifying-in; the not operator in MKNF is equivalent to ¬L in autoepistemic logic [Rosati 1997 ].
Other issues are extensions of the language used for logic programs. Adding classical negation to the τ EB and τ EH is routine, and has been done by de Bruijn et al. [2008] for FO-AEL with standard names. Other interesting extensions include nesting [Lifschitz et al. 1999] , where the closeness between nesting in logic programs and the logic MKNF suggests that an embedding is straightforward, and aggregates [Faber et al. 2004; Ferraris 2005; Pelov et al. 2007; Son and Pontelli 2007] .
Furthermore, in the present work, we considered embeddings of logic programs interpreted under the stable model semantics, which adopts a two-valued semantics. It would be interesting to also consider embedding logic programs under many-valued semantics, most importantly under the well-founded semantics [Gelder et al. 1991] , which is a three-valued semantics for logic programs with negation that has also been considered for the combination of rules and ontologies [Knorr et al. 2008; Drabent et al. 2007] . Three-valued extensions of autoepistemic logic [Denecker et al. 2003; Bonatti 1995; Przymusinski 1991b ] may be used as a starting point.
Lastly, the initial motivation for our work was the application to Semantic Web languages. Combinations of positive RIF rules with RDF and OWL DL ontologies, as we have discussed here, are just a first step. Nonmonotonic extensions of RIF [Kifer 2008] , and also the RDF Query Language SPARQL [2008] , are instances of the combination problems we have sketched in this article . The semantics of both nonmonotonic RIF and SPARQL can be expressed in terms of nonmonotonic logic programs [Kifer 2008; Angles and Gutierrez 2008; Polleres 2007] , but their combination with OWL ontologies is still an open issue on the W3C's agenda in completing the Semantic Web architecture [Bratt 2007 ]. We expect that our results can be used to provide valuable insights towards the
